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 Author shows how the concept of the general will plays a central role in a cer-
tain type of liberal anti-totalitarian philosophy. Author confronts Talmon’s and 
Berlin’s criticism of the general will with Arendt’s understanding of the French 
Revolution. Talmon and Berlin argue that the concept of the general will was re-
sponsible for the totalitarian character of the French Revolution. Author uses Ar-
endt’s comparison of the French and the American Revolution to ask a question: 
If the general will is intrinsically totalitarian does it mean that America is also to-
talitarian if one shows that for Madison and Hamilton the American constitution 
was the incarnation of the general will?  
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 In this essay I will show how the concept of the general will plays a very important 
role in a certain type of liberal critique of totalitarianism. I will compare Talmon’s and 
Berlin’s understanding of the French Revolution with Hannah Arendt’s views on the 
Revolution. Talmon and Berlin believe that the French Revolution was totalitarian and 
that the concept of the general will played an important role in it.  
 I will also briefly present a few ideas from the Federalist Papers, especially Hamil-
ton’s argument about the importance of the judicial review. In my opinion this argument 
de facto uses a version of the general will. This essay consists of three segments: A – 
compares Talmon’s and Berlin’s criticisms of totalitarianism; B – shows Arendt’s un-
derstanding of the difference between the French and the American Revolution; C – 
discusses the central ideas from the Federalist Papers No. 10 and No. 78. 
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 If the domination of the general will is the key ingredient of totalitarianism, does it 
mean that America is also totalitarian if one shows that for Madison and Hamilton the 




 In this part of my essay I would like to present two liberal understandings of the 
French Revolution – Talmon’s in The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy, and Berlin’s in 
Four Essays on Liberty (especially in the essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’). I will start 
with Talomon and Berlin because I would like to compare their solutions with Arendt’s 
understanding of the difference between the French and the American Revolution. 
 At the beginning of his book Talmon makes a fundamental distinction – the distinc-
tion between empirical, liberal democracy on one hand, and totalitarian Messianic de-
mocracy on the other.  
 “The liberal approach assumes politics to be a matter of trial and error, and regards 
political systems as pragmatic contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity. It also 
recognizes a variety of levels of personal and collective endeavour, which are altogether 
outside the sphere of politics. The totalitarian democratic school, on the other hand, is 
based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It may be called po-
litical Messianism in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect 
scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to 
arrive. It recognises only one plane of existence, the political.” (Talmon, 1952: 1-2).  
 Both schools of political thinking insist on the value of liberty, but they understand 
it in a radically different way. For liberals the essence of freedom is the absence of co-
ercion; for totalitarians freedom is actualised in the pursuit of an absolute collective 
purpose. The same notion has a completely different meaning, and one of the funda-
mental causes of that difference is the notion of truth. Talmon believes that the political 
Messianism has its foundation in the monolit understanding of truth. The godfather of 
the totalitarian understanding of truth is J. J. Rousseau. The third chapter of Talmon’s 
book ‘Totalitarian Democracy (Rousseau)’ tries to explain how the damage was done. 
The concept of the general will is in the center of analysis. Talmon wants to show that, 
to Rousseau, the general will is something like a mathematical truth or a Platonic idea. 
It objectively exists whether recognised by people or not. What is totalitarian about it? 
Talmon answers: “Men and people have to be brought to choose freedom, and if neces-
sary to be forced to be free” (Talmon, 1952: 42). One of the most important distinctions 
in The Social Contract is the distinction between the general will and the will of all. The 
general will regards only the common interest, while the will of all regards private in-
terests and is in fact a sum of private wills. When the people are understood as a groop 
of abstract, sufficiently informed, individuals who are not organised in interest groups 
and partial associations the will of the people and the general will be the same, says 
Rousseau, but unfortunately, that is usually not the case, and instead of dealing with the 
people, we have to deal with private interests of self-interested associations. Obviously, 
the will of all belongs to Talmon’s liberal democracy, and the general will is necessarily 
totalitarian, because it does not believe that the common good can be achieved “…when 
cabals and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association” 
(Rousseau, 1961: 26). Talmon believes that the distinction between the general will and 
the will of all opened the door for totalitarianism, and that historically became obvious 
during the French Revolution. Two extremely important things happened during the 
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Revolution – the first one is the identification of the general will and Robespierre’s 
party, the second one is the war against factions in the name of liberty. How did that 
happen? The general will objectivelly exists and it is identical with the interest of the 
people. Unfortunately the people can not grasp the general will. Jacobins can, which 
consequently means that Jacobins are the people. The general will is indivisible, and 
factions are standing in its way. They should be removed. Talmon quotes Saint-Just 
who says: “The foundest prayer a good citizen can pray for his country, the greatest 
benefaction a generous nation may derive from its virtue, is the ruin, is the fall of the 
factions” (Talmon, 1952: 116). Like their teacher Rousseau, Saint-Just and Robespierre 
thought that a faction was an expression of selfishness, and that it must be crashed. The 
logic of terror has its origin in the logic of Rousseau’s philosophy. The circle is closed, 
what started as an ethical idea which insists on equal rights for all men ended up in a 
terror of chosen few. Talmon believes that the starting point, the idea of man per se, was 
wrong, because men understood as abstract individuals were not seen within their social 
setting, and they were supposed to spell out the general will not as members of groups, 
classes and parties but as individuals. That is the way towards plebiscitary democracy, 
which is a step from totalitarian democracy. The real problems began when the concept 
of popular sovereignty, in which people are understood as a sum of individuals, was 
actualised during the French Revolution. The people understood in that way simply do 
not exist, which consequently means that the people can not express the will of the peo-
ple. In totalitarian democracy a group of citizens believes that it knows the general will, 
and that that particular knowledge gives to the group the political right to exercise 
power in the name of the people. When that happens with the consent of the people, as 
in France during the Revolution, we have a clear example of totalitarian democracy; of 
terror commited in order to achieve freedom. 
 Now I would like to present a few aspects of Isaiah Berlin’s attempt to defend the 
liberal culture of the West. Berlin’s essay Two Concepts of Liberty is theoretically very 
close to Talmon’s book, but the logic of his argument is slightly different. Berlin does 
not make a distinction between liberal and totalitarian democracy, but his distinction 
between positive and negative liberty is equally interesting and important.  
 In Berlin’s opinion the fundamental value of the liberal culture of the West is per-
sonal freedom, and it can not be found neither in the ancient Greek nor in Hegel’s or 
Rousseau’s philosophy. Only within the liberal tradition (Locke, Mill, Constant, Toc-
queville), the frontier between the area of private life and the public authority is prop-
erly drawn. 
 Negative liberty secures the area within which the subject (a person or group of per-
sons) is left to do whatever he wants without interference by other persons. 
 The positive understanding of liberty tries to answer the question “What, or who is 
the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather 
than that?” (Berlin, 1991: 122). The distinction is important because Berlin wants to 
show that the positive understanding of liberty can end up in totalitarianism. That means 
that a totalitarian state can be based on the value of freedom. This way of thinking is 
completely Talmonean, that is why I would like to see what Berlin has to say about 
Rousseau and about the relationship between liberty and democracy.  
 If by coersion we understand the deliberate interference of other human beings 
within the area in which one could othervise act, than we can say that being free in the 
negative sense means not being interfered with by others – freedom is absence of coer-
cion. Rousseau’s understanding of freedom obviously does not belong to the sphere of 
negative freedom. Does it belong to the sphere of positive freedom? “Rousseau does not 
mean by liberty the ‘negative’ freedom of the individual…, but the possesion by all, and 
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not mearly by some, of the fully qualified members of a society of a shere in the public 
power which is entitled to interfere with every aspect of every citizen’s life” (Berlin, 
1991: 162-163). The French Revolution was “an eruption of the desire for ‘positive’ 
freedom”, writes Berlin, and that desire was not looking for the protection of the indi-
viduals and their rights, but for political power and political liberation. The sovereignty 
of the people can easily destroy the sovereignty of individuals. The sovereignty of the 
people, or the sovereignty of the nation becomes the tyranny of the majority and the tyr-
anny of the political sphere over the frontiers of private life. Democracy can be fatal for 
freedoms of individuals; popular government can crash individuals as successfully as 
monarchy, maybe even better. Berlin agrees with Constant who saw in Rousseau the 
most dangerous enemy of individual liberty. The problem is in Rousseau’s idea that one 
by giving oneself to all gives oneself to none. Constant pointed out that even if the sov-
ereign is ‘everybody’, ‘everybody’ can still oppress its own members. Democracy is 
rather a threat than a way to protect freedom.  
 Similarity between Berlin and Talmon is obvious. They both insist on the distinction 
between public and private sphere. The private sphere is the space of individual liberty 
and it should be protected from the political power which belongs to the public sphere. 
Totalitarian societies do not respect the barrier between the spheres; all relations are 
potentially political, and nobody’s personal freedom is safe. Collectivism dominates 
over individualism, and the general will crashes individual, personal interests in the 
name of people, nation, or freedom. Something like the national interest, or the will of 
the people exists a priori, and the task of philosophers and revolutionaries is to recog-
nise and to understand the objective will, and then to actualise the will in the real life. 
The actualisation of the general will is called revolution. Formally speaking there are no 
differences between Jacobins and Bolshevicks. Both parties claim to know the objective 
truth, and both parties believe that the fact that the ultimate knowledge is theirs allows 




 Hannah Arendt compared two great revolutions – the French and the American. 
From her point of view the French Revolution was a big historical failure, while the 
American Revolution was an outstanding success. In the first part of her book On 
Revolution Arendt wants to explain why the American Revolution represents a para-
digmatic case of a successful revolution. The object of her criticism is primarily the 
French Revolution. However, in the second part of the book Arendt changes the direc-
tion of her criticism and tries to show that even the American Revolution did not secure 
the institutional space for a real political freedom. I will shortly present both arguments. 
First, what went wrong in Frence? 
 The aim of every revolution is freedom, writes Arendt, but the question is whose 
freedom? The answer is usually freedom of the people. The people or nation (which in 
the French Revolution means the same) are the sovereign. When Rousseau talks about 
the sovereign he means the people. The national sovereignty was supposed to replace 
the sovereignty of monarch. The highest source of power is not the king, but the people. 
The nation has a right to be free, and every man has the same right. The liberation 
should happen simultaneously; the liberation of the nation and the liberation of each 
man is one and the same. The starting point of the revolution in France was freedom – 
the freedom of the abstractly understood nation, and the abstractly understood man. But 
the reality was completely different. Arendt points out that the French people did not 
start the revolution to achieve the actualization of national sovereignty, but to escape 
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from poverty. The ideal of the Revolution was freedom, but the actual goal of the 
Revolution was happiness of the people. The social misery determined the course of the 
revolution. “It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the as-
sistance of the French Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to 
its doom… It was necessity, the urgent needs of the people, that unleashed the terror 
and sent the Revolution to its doom” (Arendt, 1990: 60). The terror was caused by the 
logic of events not by the logic of philosophy. This is a point which shows the differ-
ence between Arendt’s and Talmon’s (or Berlin’s) understanding of the French Revolu-
tion. Talmon saw the origin of totalitarianism in the general will, and his methodology 
was a geneology of ideas, while Arendt tries to understand the appearance of terror 
within the logic of the actual historical situation. She, of course, knows the general will 
argument and sometimes uses it herself, but the fact that the French Revolution started 
in a country in which the social problems were fundamental is more important to her 
than the totalitarian potential of Rousseau’s philosophy. In fact the totalitarian aspect of 
Rousseau’s thinking was actualized because Rousseau was discussed and understood in 
a specific historical situation. The redistribution of the wealth, which was necessary in 
order to achieve the happiness of the people, caused the bloodshed in France. Poverty 
was the driving force of the French Revolution and it swallowed the ideal of freedom. It 
is sad, writes Arendt, that the revolution which ended up in a bloody mess has made 
world history, while the American Revolution, “so triumphantly successful”, remained 
an event of local importance.  
 What are the fundamental differences between the French and the American Revolu-
tion? The first one is obviously the presence (or absence) of poverty. The crucial reason 
for the success of the American Revolution was the absence of social misery. Before the 
Revolution, America was not a perfectly just society, but the differences between the 
rich and the poor were not as dramatic as in Europe. This is extremely important, be-
lieves Arendt, because the concept of freedom remained in the focus of the Founding 
Fathers, and it was not destructed by the cry for social justice and happiness. That is the 
reason why the American Revolution ended up with a workable constitution, which is a 
second big difference between the revolutions. In Arendt’s opinion the American Con-
stitution is the highest point of the Revolution. It is telos of the Revolution, because it 
secures the space of (and for) freedom. The French revolutionaries were less successful. 
The Jacobin constitution was changed and replaced a few years after its acceptance. One 
of the reasons for the failure of that constitution is the concept of the people on which it 
was based.  
 The concept of the people is the third big difference between the revolutions. For the 
Americans the people meant “a multitude of voices and interests”; for Jacobins the peo-
ple was a body which consisted of abstract individuals who have their prepolitical natu-
ral rights. The American concept was realistic, the French was not workable. These are 
the fundamental reasons why the Founding Fathers finished their historical job success-
fully, and why the French Revolution failed.  
 In the first part of the book Hannah Arendt sounded like a person who was deeply 
impressed with the achievements of the American Revolution, that is why the change of 
the tone of her discussion, in the second part of the book, can be a bit surprising. The 
last chapter of the book is called The Revolutionary Tradition and its Lost Treasure. 
The American Revolution lost its treasure. What does Arendt understand by treasure? In 
order to answer this question I must shortly present two Arendt’s distinctions. Like 
Talmon, who made the distinction between liberal and totalitarian democracy, and Ber-
lin, who insisted on the difference between positive and negative liberty, Hannah Arend 
founded her theoretical operation on the distinction between liberty and freedom. Tal-
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mon’s and Berlin’s distinctions are essentially telling the same thing; Arendt’s distinc-
tion is trying to point out something completely different.  
 “It may be truism to say that liberation and freedom are not the same; that liberation 
may be the condition of freedom but by no means leads automatically to it; that the no-
tion of liberty implied in liberation can only be negative, and hence, that even the inten-
tion of liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom” (Arendt, 1990: 29). 
 Liberty understood in the negative way is identical with the freedom of movement, it 
is like power of locomotion, writes Arendt, and it was not the goal of revolution. The 
notion of liberty can “cover” the concept of civil rights, but that is not what revolutions 
in France and America were about. The revolutions wanted to achieve freedom. Hannah 
Arendt does not hide that her understanding of freedom has its origin in Greek political 
thought. For the Greeks and especially for Aristotle the life of a free man needed the 
presence of others, needed the community of peers and the political space in which 
freedom can be exercised. Freedom is a political way of life; it is a public activity. Lib-
erty is just a lack of oppression, freedom is activity. 
 The second Arendt’s distinction is the distinction between power and violence. That 
distinction is necessary, because Arendt wants to say that political power is not a prob-
lem in itself. Power looks like violence when freedom is reduced to liberty, but that is a 
mistake, of course.  
 “[P]ower come into being when and where people would get together and bind 
themselves through promises, covenants, and mutual pledges; only such power, which 
rested on reciprocity and mutuality, was real power and legitimate, whereas the so-
called power of kings or princes or aristocrats, because it did not spring from mutuality 
but, at best, rested only on consent, was spurious and usurped” (Arendt, 1990: 181).  
 Obviously in Arendt’s theory power and freedom belong together. Power is a result 
of freedom; it is the outcome of the public, political activity of free citizens. Freedom 
(and the power of free and active citizens) is the lost treasure of the American Revolu-
tion. How did the American Revolution lose its treasure? Arendt’s answer is very clear 
and surprising. The American Revolution lost its treasure because it did not secure a 
space where freedom could be exercised. The answer is surprising because the space of 
freedom should have been secured by the constitution, and the American Constitution 
was one of the reasons why the revolution in America was “triumphantly successful”. 
The constitution failed to provide the space of freedom, says Arendt, because it allows 
genuine political activities only to the representatives of the people, but not to the peo-
ple themselves. The Constitution secures liberty not freedom. Freedom exists only for 
the elite; America is a version of aristocratic liberal society; it is liberal but not free. The 
formula “government of the people by the people” is replaced by the formula “govern-
ment of the people by an elite sprung from the people”. Hannah Arendt wants to show 
that the operation (the revolution) was successful, but the patient (freedom) unfortu-
nately died. 
 Is she Anti-Federalist? I will try to answer that question later. First I have to com-
pare Arendt’s philosophical solutions with Talmon’s and Berlin’s ideas. The funda-
mental difference is obvious, while Talmon and Berlin founded their criticism of totali-
tarianism on the distinction between public and private, and on the concept of negative 
liberty, Arendt’s strongest point is criticism of the constitution which secured the nega-
tive liberty. They are all disgusted with totalitarianism, but Arendt passionately attacks 
a modern liberal society as well. The final object of her criticism is the starting point of 
Talmon’s and Berlin’s liberalism. Arendt’s freedom is Berlin’s positive liberty. She is 
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not afraid of the public power but of “the dangers of corruption and perversion” which 
arise from private interests, and she is certainly not afraid of democracy.  
 “What we today call democracy is a form of government where the few rule, at least 
supposedly, in the interest of many. This government is democratic in that popular wel-
fare and private happiness are its chief goals; but it can be called oligarchic in the sense 
that public happiness and public freedom have again became the privilege of the few” 
(Arendt, 1990: 269).  
 I will come back to this comparison of Arendt and Talmon/Berlin, but I would first 
like to present a few ideas from the Federalist Papers No. 10, No. 51 and No.7 8, with 
the help of Rousseau’s distinction between the general will and the will of all. 
 
C 
 Faction is the most important issue discussed in No. 10. Madison believes that one 
of the biggest advantages of a federal union is its ability “to break and control the vio-
lence of faction”. Faction consists of “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common im-
pulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community” (Madison, 1991: 78). Madison sees two 
methods of “curing the mischiefs” of faction – the first one is simply by removing the 
causes of faction, the second one is by controlling its effects. The causes of faction can 
be removed in two ways: by destroying the liberty or by giving to every citizen the 
same opinions, passions and interests. Consequences of both methods are fatal, writes 
Madison, because they destroy the natural diversity of human beings. “The diversity in 
the faculties of men from which the right of property originate, is not less an insuperable 
obstacle to a uniformity of interests” (Madison, 1991: 78). For Madison the protection 
of different faculties is the first object of government. Why? Because the essence of 
Lockean and liberal understanding of liberty is the free use of one’s faculties. The pro-
tection of property which is a result of the free usage of one’s faculties is what liberal 
government is actually about. But now we have a problem, because Madison uses the 
word faction in two ways: the first meaning of the word is the group of people whose 
activity is against the permanent interest of the community, the second meaning is any 
group of citizens with a defined interest. Had Madison said that any interest group was 
against the common interest he would have been forced to accept the removal of causes 
of faction as a proper method. An interest group becomes a faction in a negative way 
when it tries to use the institutions of the state to put forward its interests. The best way 
to do that is by acts of legislation, but no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, 
says Madison, and justice should impartially “hold the balance” between interest 
groups, not function in the interest of one of them. An interest group becomes a faction 
when it tries to change the rules of the game, when it tries to reshape the community in 
its own interest. I will return to this point later, first I must present Madison’s next step. 
 The causes of faction can not be removed which means that the second method (the 
controlling of the effects of factions) should be accepted. If a faction consists of less 
than a majority, the majority can defeat its “sinister views” by vote. But what shall be 
done when a majority is included in a faction? How to secure the public good and pri-
vate rights against the majority? Pure democracy can not stop the majority (it is “in-
compatible with personal security or the rights of property”), but a republic can. Repub-
lic is a government based on the scheme of representation, which means that a small 
number of representatives is elected by the rest of citizens. Why is that so important? 
Because the chosen body of citizens may recognize the public good better than the peo-
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ple themselves. This consequently puts out of the story the majority of population and 
that is what Madison wants. In No. 63 Madison defends Senate, he writes: “Thus far I 
have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed 
Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little 
blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shell not scruple 
to add that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense of the people 
against their own temporary errors and delusions” (Madison, 1991: 384). 
 Senate should protect citizens from their “irregular passions”, which means that Sen-
ate functions as an institutional form of national rationality. Passions belong to the peo-
ple; reason belongs to the representatives of the people.  
 That is the first way to protect liberty. The second solution is to create a state over a 
large area. In a big republic a greater variety of parties and interests will exist, and it 
will be difficult to form a majority faction. In No. 51 Madison repeats his ideas from 
No. 10 and tries to explain them in the clearest possible way. He describes both methods 
of protecting liberty from faction again.  
 “The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. 
Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and depended on the society, the society 
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights 
of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations 
of the majority” (Madison, 1991.: 324).  
 About the representative government Madison writes: “But what is government it-
self but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels no govern-
ment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the greatest difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” 
(Madison, 1991: 322).  
 The self-control of government was not discussed in No. 10. One aspect of that self-
control, the relationship between legislature and judiciary is particularly interesting 
within the context of this essay, especially Hamilton’s ideas presented in No. 78. 
 At the beginning of No. 78 Hamilton points out the essential role of judiciary; it 
should function as a barrier to “the encroachments and oppressions of the representative 
body”. Judiciary is, writes Hamilton, the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution, because the power of judiciary is much smaller than the power of execu-
tive (which holds the sward of the country) or the power of legislature (which holds the 
purse). The judiciary does not have either force or will, but merely judgement. This is a 
very important statement. The power of the judiciary is based on judgement which 
means that the judiciary represents the most rational part of government. In previous 
papers Madison identified government with reason, in No. 78 Hamilton goes even fur-
ther. The judiciary is the only part of government capable of protecting the Constitution. 
It must be said that the President’s veto was originally designed to protect the Constitu-
tion, which means that the judiciary is not the only power that protects the Constitution, 
but, for Hamilton, it is certainly the most important. He believes that legislative act 
contrary to the Constitution are not valid, which is not surprising, but the way in which 
Hamilton defends the right of the judiciary to protect the Constitution is quite surpris-
ing. He writes: “If there should happened to be an irreconcilable variance between the 
two ... the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to 
the intention of their agents” (Hamilton, 1991: 467). Does that mean that the Constitu-
tion represents a formal actualization of the permanent interest of the community? Yes.  
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 “Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and 
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that 
of the people, declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter 
rather than the former” (Hamilton, 1991: 467-468).  
 In the first step the people surrendered their power to the representatives of the peo-
ple; the job of the representatives was to protect the people from people’s passions. 
Now Hamilton says that the judiciary should protect the people against their protectors 
in the name of the people’s will. The will of the people does’t belong neither to the peo-
ple nor to the representatives of the people, because the will of the people is the Con-
stitution. The Constitution is the general will. It is the objective good whether the repre-
sentatives of the people recognize that or not. Madison agrees that the will of the people 
does not belong to the people, and that is obvious in No. 49 in which he argues with Jef-
ferson. Jefferson was not afraid of the people, he believed in the “collected wisdom of 
the nation” and in “the common reason of the society”. He thought that every generation 
should have the right to create its own constitution, and to change the constitution writ-
ten by previous generations. Madison admits that the people are the only legitimate 
“fountain of power” but, unlike Jefferson, he insists on stability. The trust in the people 
is for Madison the trust in passions, and they should be controlled by government. 
Madison and Hamilton are essentially conservatives, and the Constitution is for them an 
instrument of conservativism. Faction is a group of people who want to change the or-
der of the society. The Constitution is there to stop them. Had they wanted Hamilton 
and Madison could have used the distinction between the general will and the will of all 
without any problems. The distinction fits into their theory almost perfectly. 
 Now I can go back to Arendt, Talmon and Berlin. What are the consequences of my 
analysis for their discussion? If the general will can function within the theory of the 
Federalists, and I believe that it can, then mere existence of the general will, and the 
group of people who believe that they know the general will does not automatically lead 
to totalitarianism. It can not be proved that the concept of the general will itself has to-
talitarian consequences. That means that Hannah Arendt was right when she insisted on 
the social and historical context of the revolution. The fundamental difference between 
the revolutions is not the presence or absence of Rousseau’s philosophy, but the pres-
ence or absence of poverty. On the other hand, her criticism of the American Revolu-
tion, presented in the last chapter of her book, is wrong, because the American Revolu-
tion did not lose its treasure. It did not lose it simply because the treasure was never 
there. The Founding Fathers were not searching for freedom but for liberty. They shared 
Madison’s understanding of liberty, and that is one of the reasons why he played such a 
big role in the making of the Constitution. Arendt tried to read into the American 
Revolution her understanding of freedom, but philosophical heroes of the American 
were British liberals not Aristotle. Finally, is Arendt an Anti-Federalist? She is not. 
From her point of view, Anti-Federalists are not much better than Federalists. It is true 
that Brutus, The Federal Farmer, and others insisted on democracy, but one of their 
strongest arguments was that the new state is going to be too powerful, and that it can 
become a threat to individual civil rights. Their starting position was negative liberty. 
The difference between Federalists and Anti-Federalists is not the difference between 
liberty and freedom, but between federation and confederation (said in our language, of 
course). The difference between them is not essential but technical. Like Talmon and 
Berlin they all believed in liberty. Arendt’s thinking has radical consequences, because 
she must insist on rewriting of the American Constitution. Jefferson is probably the 
Founding Father whose thinking is the closest to Arendt’s ideas. 
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 Rousseau’s ideas can be used on both sides of Atlantic. He is not a totalitarian 
thinker. The general will does not have to be identified with the party; it can be identi-
fied with the liberal constitution, written in the name of the people.  
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